

71.5

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL STUDY
PERSONNEL SECURITY: ARMY

1) Procedures and Timeframes

Personnel security investigations are conducted by the Defense Investigative Service (DIS). The Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF) grants, revokes or denies personnel security clearances based on the information in its data base -- the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII). In granting clearances, CCF recognizes investigations conducted by and clearances issued by other federal agencies and other military services.

The only product of CCF is a security clearance/SCI access determination, issued by the CCF Adjudications Division. There are between 15,000 - 17,000 cases requiring actual adjudicative decisions at any one time. This does not include those cases for which CCF can administratively grant a clearance, based on information already in its data base.

As the gaining command, The Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) requisitions an individual from a military or civilian personnel office. DIS then conducts an SBI and the results go to CCF for adjudication and issuance/denial of SCI access.

Investigations of US citizens with little or no derogatory information takes six to nine months. Added to this is a 45 - 90 day adjudication period. Total time between selection and delivery of a clearance is 135 to 180 days. These figures increase if derogatory information is developed or the individual has moved frequently and/or traveled extensively abroad. Cases requiring leads outside the US are "considerably lengthened" because Army Military Intelligence units run these leads and often have other priorities that take precedence.

The CCF gives priority to SCI requirements and to cases called "Compelling Needs," in which a person is essential to the functioning of a mission. CCF also grants interim clearances permitting access to SCI.

The Army stated that, prospects for reducing time required for clearance in the future do not look promising. DIS is facing staffing cuts. CCF's workload will increase with additional requirements of periodic reinvestigations, polygraph tests, and the need to clear every commissioned officer in the Army to at least a SECRET collateral level prior to recruitment.

2) Impact of Security Investigation on Agency Selection Process

The Army does not maintain agency-wide statistics on applicants not hired because they did not meet security requirements. The

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy No. 16 of 16 copies

Name:

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

INSCOM has some, but these were not provided. The collective memories of the HQ servicing civilian personnel office and the Command Security Office believe this number is "fairly low." During the initial employment process the candidate receives a detailed explanation of the security requirements, including a worksheet that shows all the items considered before a clearance is granted. It is at this point that applicants will screen themselves out and not pursue the position based on the likelihood of being denied a clearance.

The collective memory believes the number not hired because of not meeting the security requirements to be between one and two percent of the total work force. Those who withdrew during the processing of their clearance is between one-half and one percent of the total work force.

The Department of Army also noted, that faced with such a long wait between selection and hiring, many employees, particularly those in the non-intelligence skills, such as clerks and secretaries, chose employment elsewhere. There are even cases where the Army loses a potential employee to another governmental agency which can grant a clearance faster. In addition, instances have occurred where an individual, having finally received clearance, accepts employment with private industry where a top level clearance means higher pay.

3) Extent of Impact of Security Process on Lifestyle/Family Issues

The number of staff who cite as their reason for leaving their position some aspect of security requirements is insignificant.

4) Impact of Involuntary Staff Separations on Agency Security

The number of staff removed each year for security reasons is negligible. There have been a few instances of employees resigning positions at the beginning of an inquiry into some aspect of their employment.

There is no firm Army policy on assessing the potential impact of removed employees on national security interests. The Department says it does consider potential compromise of national security information in determining penalties for employees with SCI access. Alternatives to separation include lengthy suspensions without pay, reassignment to positions with lower clearance level, and 'reading off' of special access/compartmented programs.

5) Views on the Polygraph Examination as a Security Tool

Army uses the polygraph to resolve credible derogatory information developed during a normal BI. In these cases, specific questions about a person's lifestyle, behavior or activity may be asked to resolve the allegation.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

The Army view is that the polygraph examination is widely accepted throughout the intelligence community as an effective tool in the investigative process. However, it is only one part of this process and any indicators found as a result of its use should be corroborated by information gathered from traditional investigative methods.

The polygraph is used to ask security or counterintelligence questions to INSCOM staff being assigned to NSA, Special Access Programs, CIA and critical intelligence positions at DIA. Plans are underway to expand polygraph use to staff with cryptological and/or Top Secret access.

6) NAPA Staff Views

For the military intelligence agencies, it is the six to nine month timeframe for security processing that is most striking. This appears to be a question of workload within DIS, although there may be command internal procedures which would alleviate some delays - e.g. quickly forwarding requests for more data to an employee who has moved to a new work location.

While Army stated they did not have a firm policy on risk assessment for employees being involuntarily separated, the other two services do. Army could examine theirs for ideas in this regard.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

170 - 7/02/88